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Historians have recently written prolifically about the sources and 
interpretations of the American Revolution.1 The various interpretations 
of the Revolution and its political ideas convey a variety of political 
teachings; they can also serve as indices, at any given time, of the political 
commitments and cultural visions of the interpreters. This study ex-
plores these differing interpretations by showing how the materials used 
in writing histories of the American Revolution reflect long-standing 
patterns of cultural-political conflict. 
The books and broadsides used by historians today are themselves 
interpretations of history, containing canons of selection, causality and 
political value. Moreover, because these source materials imply sys-
tematic ways of interpreting history, the histories in turn serve as forms 
of knowledge used in subsequent cultural-political conflicts. Little 
wonder, then, that American political thought so often takes the form 
of history and that the conflict of political ideas in America is usually 
implicitly historical rather than explicitly philosophical. This feature 
of our political thought imposes a pervasive cultural dimension to our 
deepest political conflicts even as it blurs ideological differences. A per-
plexing result is that we have readily available two co-existing forms of 
political history. We possess narratives of the great events of our na-
tional life full of violence and conflict, while histories of our political 
ideas and institutions tell of consensus and continuity. 
The primary objective of this study is to indicate how political-
cultural conflict in early American society divided into these two different 
ways of perceiving our history and how these perceptions convey con-
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flicting theories of politics. The three major issues of conflict before, 
during and immediately following the revolutionary period 1763-1787 
are: 1) questions of the place of religion in political life; 2) questions of 
the role of law in American political structures; and 3) questions regard-
ing constitutionalism. In the case of religion, the problem concerns the 
meaning of Reformed Protestantism for Christian prophecy and new 
world destiny. In law, the issue is the authority of English legal precedent 
and the relationship between English common law rights and natural 
rights. In constitutionalism, the conflict revolves around the relevance 
of major English constitutional settlements to colonial authority and to 
the fate of liberty. 
The political meaning of the past is a crucial dimension in each of 
these areas of controversy. One pattern of political understanding in 
all three disputes can be called institutionalist. Political norms and 
ideas are held to be authoritative because they are embodied in institu-
tions which have endured. Only within stable political, legal and social 
institutions can rational judgement nourish, becoming adequate to the 
task of maintaining ordered liberty. The worth of political action is 
judged by its institutional product; the value of political ideas is meas-
ured by the extent to which they attain legal and institutional form. 
One can, however, also discern a counter-pattern to this mode of 
understanding. Events of all kinds are taken to reveal political ideas. 
The most important political norms are not expressible in legal and 
institutional formulas; their meanings derive from their perceived rela-
tionship to future events. This perspective makes history a kind of 
theodicy. Events are symbolic and revelatory; a history of their meanings 
is periodized and often apocalyptic.2 
This study also aims at a specific, if tentative conclusion. It seeks to 
understand the two dominant present modes of understanding the Amer-
ican Revolution—"Whig" and "Progressive" histories—as modern re-
statements of those institutional as well as anti-institutional forms of 
self-understanding which have always shaped our deepest conflicts. The 
contemporary his tori ographical issue, then, is not simply between an 
"idealist" consensus history and a "materialist" conflict history. A broad 
range of political and cultural values is at stake. To see political ideas 
incorporating institutions is to portray continuity, consensus and in-
tellectual complexity. As political and ideological argument, this per-
spective tends to favor the prevailing patterns of power and value. Its 
ideal of political change is change of leadership and institutional reform. 
As a mode of writing history, it stresses the importance of intellectual 
tradition and the causative role of the best articulated political ideas. 
Since political conflicts are perceived as bounded by shared norms, they 
can be regarded as resolvable through institutional compromise. 
A contrasting perspective sees political ideas in and through symbolic 
events. It focuses on the moral power of a few simple ideals, the prophetic 
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clarity of heroic actors, and the importance of conflict in revealing 
future destiny. As political-ideological argument, this view denigrates 
institutions as obstacles to a future community of belief. It urges that 
historical understanding requires the exploration of the actions and 
events behind institutions in order to discover what "really" controls 
the future. This perspective is at once more "materialistic" and more 
"idealistic" than its institutional counterpart. In both forms, however, 
its social theory is inherently radical. Such a mode of understanding 
stresses the discontinuity of history. Time is marked by conflicts demand-
ing clear moral/political choice. At its extreme, this history equates 
continuity and even historicity itself with Europe, aristocracy and cor-
ruption—an implicit denial of the significance of the New World. 
The two conflicting perspectives suggest that the American Revolu-
tion was an uneasy alliance of two rather different theories of history 
and politics. Because two distinct cultural and political foundations of 
America were proclaimed in the act of founding our nation, two distinct 
theories continue to define the historiography of the American Revo-
lution. 
i religion 
With the Great Awakening and the rise of de facto "denominational-
ism" in the 1740s, overt political division began to reflect these religious 
differences and persisted up to the settlement following the War of 
1812.3 The Great Awakening was an explosion of anti-institutional 
energies sparked by the belief in a millennium of earthly justice whose 
first marks would be a rebirth of religious faith throughout the colonies. 
The stress on the centrality of the experience of conversion and on the 
unmediated power of the biblical Word posed a direct threat to the 
structures of both Anglican and "old Dissent" churches in America. 
Indirectly, the Great Awakening and its denominational products 
threatened the whole extant social order by devaluating the religious 
importance of "works." It denigrated standards of good behavior which 
inevitably are defined by, and serve to buttress, the upper reaches of 
society.4 Anglicans in the middle and southern colonies, "old light" 
Congregationalists in New England and "old side" Presbyterians joined 
in opposing the Great Awakening. In New England especially, those 
clergymen urging a latitudinarian theology informed by enlightened 
views of natural religion and formal (or pro forma) standards for church 
membership were opponents of complete religious equality. The spokes-
men for these churches did, to be sure, profess the value of religious 
toleration but only within the bounds set by parish systems and taxation 
provisions or by means of exceptions granted to specific groups. 
The paradoxical logic of church history in this period is that the 
increasing liberalization of religion among the educated Protestants in 
the larger coastal towns deprived them of a major source of identity. 
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The seemingly progressive movement toward rational theology and legal-
istic criteria of church membership also constituted a retreat from the 
millennialist theology of their seventeenth-century Puritan ancestors. En-
lightened theology in mid-eighteenth-century America, then, had the ef-
fect of making its adherents more socially conservative vis-a-vis domestic 
colonial affairs and more attuned to a politics shaped in England.5 
The other side of this paradox holds true as well. Evangelicals at-
tempted to recapture the centrality of seventeenth-century prophetic 
themes and to reinstate a vision of America's unique calling in Christian 
history. In cultural terms, the Awakening revived ideas in America 
which most separated it from contemporary England. Precisely at the 
time when English Whig and enlightenment values were coming to 
dominate a good portion of colonial leadership, the awakened clergy 
were reasserting the visions of the early Puritans.6 
Charles Chauncy, a leading light in New England theology, saw 
nothing but danger in the popular energies released by the Great Awaken-
ing. His Seasonable Thoughts is obsessed by the dangers of itinerancy 
and revival; he complains that "women and girls; yea, Negroes, have 
taken upon them to do the business of preachers" and urges people to 
"stay in their place, following their calling.'' For more than thirty years 
the response of the Anglican clergy in Virginia and the Carolinas 
mirrored that of the Congregational/Unitarian clergy in Massachusetts 
and Connecticut. In both cases the appeals to enlightened behavior, 
along with dark warnings of incipient anarchy, were supplemented by 
the reliance on fines and imprisonments, oaths and confiscations.7 Op-
position to prevailing colonial patterns of church polity and church-
state relationships came from a radical direction. After the Great 
Awakening, a defense of religious toleration was in fact a conservative 
position to counter the pietists' demands for complete religious equality. 
The Enlightened colonial clergy appeared politically radical only from 
the perspective of eighteenth-century English denominationalism and in 
opposition to the remote threat of an Anglican Bishop in America.8 
The larger political import of these religious conflicts becomes evi-
dent in the actions of the various religious denominations during the 
revolutionary period. The only organized religious body to urge inde-
pendence from England prior to July, 1776, were the Baptist churches— 
which bore the brunt of repressive measures by those who were spokes-
men of resistance to England in the period 1765-76. Members of the 
churches formed during the Great Awakening were consistent supporters 
of the "radical" Pennsylvania constitution during the entire war period 
and after. Moreover, in the South as well as the North, the most demo-
cratic features of the first state constitutions were often proposed by 
the same groups which insisted on oaths asserting the truth of biblical 
revelation and belief in the trinity.9 Disestablishment and religious 
equality were first and most powerfully urged on religious, not philo-
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sophical, grounds. The alliance between the few radical deists and the 
many pietists was practical and temporary; their language and purposes 
often overlapped, but they remained separate.10 
These anti-institutional notions of religious order can also be seen 
as part of a larger theory of political order, one which is quite different 
from radical Whig and more traditional models of "balanced societies." 
If one's worth as a citizen is independent of institutional and social loca-
tion, and defined instead in terms of inward commitment, then all of 
the "converted" make up the authentic nation, infusing all of its in-
stitutions with a common impulse. Americans can neither discover nor 
undertake the great tasks demanded of them if they are linked together 
only by institutional ties of "meere Justice" and "Civill pollicy." Ex-
perimental religion and the infusion of grace would create one body of 
men "knitt together by this love."11 Such distinctions were first articu-
lated by John Winthrop aboard the Arabella in 1630. In the more 
democratic and political idiom of the Great Awakening, they served to 
condemn the corruptions of both English and colonial institutional life. 
In the theater of prophetic history, opposition to the imperatives of the 
elect nation is opposition to God's plan of redemption.12 Thereby seem-
ingly small conflicts over religious policy turn into major political 
conflict. 
Jonathan Mayhew symbolizes the difficult position of anti-revival 
spokesmen. As a defender of enlightened theology, Mayhew was am-
bivalent about the puritan past. His famous sermon of 1750 on tyranny 
exemplifies this ambivalence and highlights the limits of enlightened 
religion as a source of, and vehicle for, American revolutionary political 
thought. "A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission and Non-
Resistance to the Higher Powers" is often used by nineteenth and 
twentieth-century historians as exemplary of later colonial resistance to 
England,13 but it can just as well be read as a plea for acceptance of 
the colonial gentry by English Whigs. 
The occasion of Mayhew's sermon was the Church of England's prac-
tice of calling for fasting and humiliation on the anniversary of the 
1649 execution of Charles I. Instead of defending the regicide and the 
English Civil War, Mayhew first distinguishes between resistance and 
rebellion; he goes on to define the former as an integral part of the 
British Constitution. He assures his readers that resistance to Charles I 
was "not by a private junto—not by a small seditious party;—not by a 
few desperadoes . . .—but by the LORDS and COMMONS of England." 
The men who "raised an army . . . and maintained the war" were none 
other than "the whole representative body of the people;—guardians 
of the public welfare." When he turns to rebellion and regicide May-
hew's perspective continues to be secular, institutional and Whig. The 
trial court which condemned the king "was little better than a mere 
mockery of justice." Cromwell and his allies "might possibly have been 
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very wicked and designing men," and Mayhew will not be one to justify 
either Cromwell's "male administration" or the "reigning hypocrisy of 
those times." Only in its resistence phase is the civil war a reestablish-
rnent of the constitutional balance which ultimately made possible the 
"1688 Revolution, upon the justice and legality of which depends (in 
part) his present MAJESTY'S right to the throne."14 Mayhew praises 
the settlement of 1688 while he condemns the religious energies of 
the 1640s. 
Mayhew's performance drains from the Puritan Revolution all hint 
of location within a prophetic scheme, all connection to the millennialist 
energies of his ancestors as well as to the settlement of New England. 
This detachment is intentional as is clear from the remainder of the 
sermon in which Mayhew accuses the more aristocratic sectors of the 
Church of England of carrying the germs of disloyalty to the settlement 
of 1688. By contrast, Mayhew and his audience are portrayed as the 
heirs of those who protected and then reestablished the British Constitu-
tion. Mayhew—the most "radical" clergyman in Boston—so firmly lo-
cated "his" ancestors within the rubrics of English Whig history that 
even the connections between its earlier radical versions and millennialist 
themes seemed to have been quite forgotten or, rather, seemed too dan-
gerous to recount in an awakened America. The concluding paragraph 
of the sermon is a celebration of the regnant order "under the govern-
ment of a PRINCE who is satisfied with ruling according to law." The 
warning to his colonial audience befits a leading opponent of the re-
ligious revival: 
There are men who strike at liberty under the term licentiousness. 
There are others who aim at popularity under the disguise of 
patriotism . . . . There is at present amongst us, perhaps, more 
danger of the latter, than of the former. For which reason I would 
exhort you to pay all due Regard to the government over us . . . 
and to lead a quiet and peaceable life.15 
Religious conflict in the colonies creates a serious problem for his-
torians of the Revolution. On the one hand, the Great Awakening is 
the vehicle for democratic and nationalist ideas and its proponents were 
at the forefront in the battle for complete religious liberty. On the 
other hand, the most prominent religious spokesmen for resistance to 
England in the decade preceeding independence are equally noted for 
their opposition to the religious revival and its consequences. Two 1860 
sermon collections, still used today as standard sources, illustrate the 
problem posed for historians. Thornton's The Pulpit of the American 
Revolution and Moore's Patriot Preachers of the American Revolution 
clearly separate these two warring parties by putting Anglicans, Old 
Sides and Old Lights on the pre-1776 divide, preparing Americans for 
revolution, while after 1776, Baptist, New Side and New Light sermons 
urge the citizenry to give all for new heavens and a new earth. 
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In one sense, Thornton and Moore are unerringly accurate. Resis-
tance arguments do tend to be couched in institutionalist language, while 
post-Declaration rhetoric is both revolutionary and strongly anti-institu-
tionalist. But periodization, however accurate, is not explanation. It 
would be highly misleading for an historian to select as a sample only 
those sermons on one side of the divide or the other as indicative of the 
religious component of American Revolutionary political thought. It 
would be equally misleading, however, for us to conclude that a causal 
connection exists between the political ideas of the two sets of spokes-
men—that the former articulated the systematic ideas of the Revolution 
while the latter provided the more popular rhetoric to impel the events. 
In the first place, the spokesmen on either side of the divide were often 
in open conflict with each other before, during and after the Revolution. 
Furthermore, in the three decades before the Revolution, churches led 
by the rationalist and institutionalist clergy were rapidly declining in 
popularity while evangelical religion was thriving. The conflicts gener-
ated by these patterns had the effect of teaching ever larger and more 
self-confident audiences to distrust the position of the most prominent 
religious spokesmen for colonial resistance. Indeed, Jonathan Mayhew 
defended rational religion in part because it would appeal only to the 
few.16 Might not the same be said of the constitutional and political 
arguments intended to persuade his listeners? Be that as it may, the 
larger audience's distrust made sense. In Moore's collection, all five 
sermons adduced as examples of American patriotism in the period 
1766-1775 were by clergymen who led the opposition to the Great 
Awakening. Three of those five became Loyalists, while a fourth (May-
hem) died in 1766. All five of the spokesmen during the war years were 
evangelical products of the Awakening and veterans of struggles for 
religious equality before, during and after the Revolution. 
Periodization accurately suggests that the voices of two distinct 
political cultures were simultaneously abroad in the land. That at dif-
ferent times the one or the other voice was more clearly heard, however, 
ought not to suggest causal sequence. The ideas of rational theology 
and tolerant establishment were culturally anglophile. Their spokesmen 
and audience identified with Whig counterparts in England; they saw 
colonial institutions as idealized or purified versions of English ones. 
Their writings were intended for three audiences: their peers and 
mentors at home, those in England and their increasingly nondeferential 
inferiors at home. The resistance theories of these clergymen and their 
lay counterparts may have been contagious to a more revolutionary audi-
ence, but those same theories were often not strong enough to infect 
themselves with the hope of a new era. For this group, independence 
was a dangerous but final act to protect established laws and liberties. 
The political voice of evangelical and millennialist religion was, 
paradoxically, both clearer and more problematic. Recent studies have 
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shown the persistence of strong correlations between radically demo-
cratizing political beliefs and evangelical religion in the 1750s in Con-
necticut and Massachusetts, as well as in the first constitutional struggles 
in Southern states. Many of the more radical doctrines of the Puritan 
Revolution were revived via the Great Awakening. The social theories 
of groups such as the Levellers and Fifth Monarchists were now becom-
ing commonplace portraits of life in the approaching millennium.17 
We do know that political thought in the England of the mid-eighteenth 
century—even in its most radically Whig versions—did not contain these 
religious elements. To be sure, radical Whigs in both England and 
America developed a complex theory of constitutional corruption and 
an accompanying rhetoric of conspiracy designed to counter the cor-
ruptors while restoring constitutional balance. But even the most 
radical versions of conspiracy theory voiced in America were limited by 
their constitutionalist origins and context. What is more, the limits are 
so stringent that the use of this rhetoric cannot tell us with any accuracy 
whether its user became a patriot or a loyalist. Evangelical religious 
theories of corruption, however, lacked a politically significant counter-
part in eighteenth-century England and were inherently radical in the 
American context. To the adherents of those theories the source of 
corruption was not constitutional imbalance, but a condition inevitably 
flowing from unconverted men. Moreover, they held that corruption 
exists wherever men's vision is bounded by the institutional limits of 
"works." Religious revival and prophetic theology in America were thus 
intensely political from the very start; millennialist doctrine stipulated 
the sudden convergence of revival, institutional destruction and—most 
crucially—social unity. 
Colonial elites and later historians, both Whig and progressive, had 
great difficulty in understanding the evangelical side of religious conflict 
in the pre-Revolutionary period. And because the resulting political 
conflicts do not parallel those of England or Europe generally, the re-
ligious sources are as baffling now as they were to such contemporaries 
as Benjamin Franklin. Writing in support of establishing Pennsylvania 
as a royal colony against those who would maintain its proprietary status, 
Franklin stated that "Religion has happily nothing to do with our pres-
ent Differences." The two parties were known as "Quakers" (meaning 
Quakers and some Old Light Presbyterians) and "Presbyterians" (mean-
ing New Light Presbyterians and Baptists). Yet Franklin was not misled 
by his own claim, for the first two objections which his Cool Thoughts 
addressed concerned the heated issue of religion.18 
ii law 
When our forefathers colonized the wilderness of America, they 
brought with them the common law of England. They claimed it 
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as their birthright, and they left it as the most valuable inheritance 
to their children. (James A. Bayard, 1802) 
Our ancestors . . . were possessed of the knowledge of the laws 
and jurisprudence of /England/; but were free from any obliga-
tions of subjection to them. /Their law/ was derived from the law 
of nature and of revelation . . . is near us . . . is within us, written 
upon the table of our hearts. (Jesse Root, 1798).19 
We have seen that religious conflict is not sufficiently accounted for 
in studies of American revolutionary political thought. Similarly, sup-
port for and opposition to the common law, lawyers, and judges is 
acknowledged but not explained. Spokesmen for late colonial legal cul-
ture were in somewhat of the awkward position of their theological 
counterparts: as they sought approval and intellectual standards from 
England, they faced charges of betrayal, arrogance and declension at 
home. And as early leaders of colonial resistance, they tended to divide 
or become silent as independence approached. 
The two cases are not exactly alike, of course. Opposition to legal 
values did not take clear organizational form and opponents to the 
common law appear weak and without alternatives to the prevailing 
system. The history of law and lawyers in colonial America is only now 
being thoroughly explored.20 Enough is known, however, to suggest 
grave difficulties for both the Whig and progressive historian. The 
former is hard put to find intellectual sources for the Revolution in late 
colonial legal ideas; the latter to explain the causes and extent of legal 
change in the post-Independence period. 
Colonial legal history contains some of the same paradoxical features 
found in colonial religious history. In the four decades before the 
Revolution, law and practice throughout the colonies was beginning to 
adhere more strictly to English models. Thus, the influx and growing 
prestige of trained lawyers and judges, the institution of strict forms of 
pleading, the attempts to frame the bar on English models—all these 
combined to change earlier colonial patterns significantly. Before these 
innovations, colonial law and practice had diverged widely from the 
English model, containing many modern features which England was 
not to achieve for almost two centuries. A number of factors prevented 
any thorough reception of the common law. Among them were the 
codification of civil law, the use of written evidence and simple forms 
of pleading, combined with hostile regulation of the legal profession, 
the use of lay judges, easy appeals procedures, rights to lay representation 
and the extraordinary power of juries.21 
While many welcomed a closer adherence to English models as a 
mark of colonial economic and political progress, others viewed these 
changes as a threat to colonial self-definition. For this latter group, the 
rise of lawyers and the increasing reliance on legal technicality was a 
sign of corruption. An indication of this foreboding is that many awak-
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ened clergymen were lawyers prior to their conversions, thus making a 
repudiation of their earlier ways a pointed condemnation of a life of 
law. The call to return to the faith of a purer colonial past was also a 
call to rid the colonies of present-day corruption. In this call, the 
promised future had no room for lawyers and the artificial reason of the 
common law. Both were seen as part of a larger theology of works which 
had to yield to the power of faith. To be sure, not all opposition to late 
colonial legal changes came from the ranks of the awakened. The eco-
nomic interests and habits of many colonists were annexed to earlier 
legal practices. Others condemned the common law as a relic of feu-
dalism, part of the "Norman Yoke" which caused the death of primitive 
Saxon liberty. But as in England during the Puritan Revolution, the 
most radical legal reformers were the most convinced millennialists. It 
is no wonder that 1776 witnessed an explosion of anti-legal, anti-lawyer 
sentiment.22 That there was a short-lived victory of the common law 
and trained lawyers in America immediately preceeding the Revolution, 
then, creates a special problem for understanding the legal changes after 
the Revolution. 
The colonial leadership saw the innovations after 1750 as signs of 
sophistication and maturity, even as the law became less accessible, more 
archaic and supportive of a. more stratified social order.23 Sophistication 
in the common law was at once a mark of high status, a proof of one's 
identity as English, and a weapon against those in the colonies who 
were inclined to revive a somewhat embarrassing seventeenth-century 
past. The victory did, however, entail some heavy costs as resistance 
turned to revolution. Members of the newly-established and highly re-
stricted Suffolk County (Boston) Bar were among the first to pay dearly; 
an overwhelming proportion of that bar did not support independence 
and many were forced to flee.24 Immediate post-independence policies 
reflected the new power and confidence of an anti-legal culture through-
out the colonies. No compulsory bar association and no bar-controlled 
provision for legal training survived the Revolution anywhere in Amer-
ica. Specialized legal training per se was devalued when complex forms 
of pleading and other highly technical court procedures were swept 
away. To prevent or at least to slow down these rapid innovations in 
law, leaders steeped in English legal culture often made common cause 
with earlier opponents of the Great Awakening.25 
Progressive historians have pointed to this anti-legal policy and to 
the rapid changes in the courts as evidence of a kind of self-generated 
social revolution. The sudden invention and explosion of "democratic" 
values against "aristocratic" ones are asserted without seriously seeking 
to account for the specific origins of that impulse.26 When stressing the 
role of ideas at all these historians point to the Enlightenment emphasis 
on natural rights argument. This stress is to some extent justified be-
cause that language was often used to motivate legal reform efforts later 
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in the nineteenth century. What such a formulation misses, however, is 
the appeal of this language to evangelical culture and the merging of 
secular and sacred images in the process. The patterns of innovation 
as well as the range of political support for change become clearer when 
they are viewed as an attempted recapture of seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-century colonial values, values partly anchored in religious 
views. Such was the economic and social thrust of millennialist doctrine 
in America—a thousand-year reign of peace and equality on earth (or 
only in America) before Christ's second appearance (also in America) 
—that it is difficult to discern where religious images stop and secular-
utopian hopes begin. In the writings of Jesse Root and Joel Barlow, 
for example, the Christian liberty of the reborn and the natural liberty 
of the American innocent are conflated into a form of communal cement. 
The law which is to define one's duties is more a symbolic and didactic 
reminder of inner virtue than it is of a harsh, external instrument of 
social control. 
The old conflict over law and lawyers was renewed on altered terms 
after the adoption of the United States Constitution. At first the issue 
centered on the question of whether the federal courts could claim 
common law powers of jurisdiction, but it soon became the more partisan 
one of equating a strong defense of common law with belief in aristo-
cratic or monarchical government. Even after the defeat of the Federalist 
Party in national politics, this conflict was continued between "moder-
ates" and "radicals" within the Jefferson and Madison administrations, 
culminating finally in the codification controversies in the 1830s. It is 
less important to recount the specific history and changing arguments 
of these conflicts27 than it is to note the systematically different perspec-
tives of the role of law in America which they reveal. Those who favored 
codification as a declaration of freedom from the authority of British 
precedent and a domestic legal elite harbored a vision of America as 
becoming less complex, more communal, in Joel Barlow's words, becom-
ing as "if the state consisted of nothing more than one great society 
composed of all the people." External legal authority can never be a 
product of particular men's wills or knowledge; in the words of the 
1798 Connecticut Reports, it can only rightfully flow from "the estab-
lishment of the citizens who rejoice in being ruled and governed by its 
laws, for the blessings it confers."28 
While codifiers and evangelicals were touting America's future free-
dom from dependence on complex and differentiating legal forms, those 
defending the continuity of American and English law saw in complexity 
and differentiation the very foundation of order. The defense of common 
law precedent and rigorous legal education was tied in turn to a larger 
doctrine of political institutions. The first response to Jefferson's attack 
on the Federalist's Judiciary Act of 1801 echoed the response of genera-
tions of enlightened clergymen to evangelical demands for religious 
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equality. The lawyer Jonathan Mason contemptuously inquired of the 
Jeffersonian Party, "Is the millennium so near at hand?" His view of 
the American future was the reverse of those who would write codes or 
rely on affection: "Is not our wealth increasing? And will not contro-
versies arise in proportion to the growth of our numbers and property?" 
Without the institutional anchors of the common law, authority in an 
increasingly divided America would dissolve. In the words of a con-
gressional speech of 1802, "Stripped of the common law, there would be 
neither [Federal] Constitution nor Government." Two decades later, 
Republican moderates typified by Joseph Story viewed the highly-trained 
upper bar as "sentinels upon the outposts of the constitution." Among 
the radicals, the alliance between evangelical culture and democratic 
legal reform remained firm until the 1830s. The democratic and en-
trepreneurial individualism of the Jacksonian period broke this alliance 
by creating the conditions predicted by an earlier Federalist: "there 
must be much law [and, presumably, many judges and lawyers] or there 
will be no justice."29 
Progressive historians are certainly accurate in their emphasis on 
the periodic conflicts over law, courts and lawyers during this entire 
period. Less clear, however, are attempts to explain the intellectual 
origins and continuities of these conflicts. For example, by pointing to 
geographic and economic causes, one assumes that the ideas of the demo-
cratic reformers are simply waiting to be rediscovered each time the 
occasion arises—or that democratic ideas themselves are the residue re-
maining when privilege is destroyed. Whig historians, by contrast, slight 
the seriousness of these conflicts over law by pointing to an enduring 
intellectual and institutional tradition which has been the hallmark of 
the upper bar and, to a lesser degree, the appellate court system. Stress 
on the unity of Anglo-American legal ideas before and after the Revolu-
tion, however, makes it difficult to understand the opponents of that 
tradition. The ideas of the latter are placed in a kind of limbo—as 
simplified or enthusiastic derivatives of the tradition, or as the tradition 
modified by material interest and geographic conditions or as general 
anti-intellectual hostility. 
Given these contrasting difficulties, progressive and Whig explanations 
of the role of ideas tend to complement each other. The progressive 
grants the power of complex laws and the prestige of intellectual tradi-
tion in America, but views that power as a cover for privilege and a be-
trayal of American national destiny. The Whig, for whom institutional 
tracks are the only safe trail leading to ideas, sees complexity as proof 
that articulate ideas lie at the base of American political life—even 
though he grants that thoughtless multitudes rise up periodically to 
deny them or, more generously, to prevent their misuse. 
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iii constitutionalism 
The blessings of society depend entirely on the constitutions of 
government . . . . (John Adams, 1776) 
Where then is our republicanism to be found? Not in our Consti-
tution certainly, but merely in the spirit of our people. (Thomas 
Jefferson, 1816) 
The Declaration of Independence was a social compact, by which 
the whole people covenanted with each citizen of the United 
Colonies, and each citizen with the whole people . . . . (John 
Quincy Adams, 1831)30 
The conflict over religion and law suggests that American revolu-
tionary thought combines two distinct forms of historical understanding. 
Moreover, historical interpretations of these conflicts suggest that these 
two forms of understanding continue down to the present day as Whig 
and Progressive history. Therefore to ask of these interpretations about 
the source of the constitutional values of the Revolution is to receive 
two different answers, both of them perplexing. 
Two histories written in the 1920s illustrate our point. Charles Mc-
Ilwain's The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation 
begins with the assertion that "so long as American opposition to alleged 
grievances was constitutional it was in no sense revolutionary" and then 
proceeds to trace the pivotal role of constitutional argument in the 
period from 1763 to 1776. He concludes that with "the revolutionary 
pronouncement of the fifteenth of May, 1776" the entire constitutional 
argument becomes irrelevant, for on that day American spokesmen "have 
perforce become revolutionaries and are no longer Constitutionalists . . . . 
They turn now to another audience and with another appeal."31 
What are we to make of this conclusion? Does the act of revolution 
constitute a repudiation of constitutional ideas per se or only of the 
formal-legal assumptions of the British Constitution? Does constitutional 
argument become forever secondary in America after the Revolution, or 
are revolutionary ideas only a brief interlude before a new constitutional 
foundation completes, and perhaps destroys, revolutionary ideas? What-
ever the answers, of two things we can be sure. First, along with large 
numbers of revolutionary leaders, Macllwain sees the act of revolution 
as a momentous break in constitutional ideas. Second, these revolu-
tionaries thought that the constitutional ideas of both British and colonial 
origin must be of continuing relevance to America after the Revolution 
was concluded. 
The gap between constitutional thoughts and revolutionary deeds is 
also evident—but in mirror image—in J. Franklin Jameson's The Ameri-
can Revolution Considered as a Social Movement. The progressive 
Jameson agrees with Mcllwain in acknowledging the power of constitu-
tional argument in resistance to England until the war began. His de-
nial of the relevance of these same ideas (he calls them "mere political 
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aspects") after 1776 is an essential preface to his study, for Jameson holds 
that the "stream of revolution" carried its own ideas which created the 
predominant reality after independence. The flood of events which 
"spread abroad upon the land," washed away both English institutions 
and English forms of thought, leaving in its wake a new and democratic 
nation.32 Jameson's study centers on the changes occurring after 1776, 
but nevertheless prompts us to ask the other side of the questions posed 
by Mcllwain: from where do the new post-revolutionary ideas come? 
Do the events of the Revolution somehow create de novo a new world 
of democratic ideas or are these events the outward signs and political 
forms of thoughts and feelings which have always been vouchsafed a 
new Jerusalem? 
Jameson's history is progressive, not prophetic, but elements of 
soteriology suggest themselves in the very structure of his story. Like 
the tradition of prophetic history, Jameson's record of events is also a 
story of the ideas, spirits and ends revealed by the events. In the stock 
phrase of the Calvinist clergy, "Prophecie is Historié antedated and 
Historié is Postdated Prophecie" for "the same thing is told in both." 
Jameson's concluding chapter, "Thought and Eeeling," confirms this im-
pression, for there he points to one set of pre-revolutionary ideas unam-
biguously connected to post-revolutionary events, the ideas regarding 
religious freedom and church disestablishment. Despite his assumption 
of a fundamental discontinuity in formal political (i.e., constitutional) 
ideas, Jameson posits a "unity in American church history as well as a 
frequent connection between it and the civil history of the nation."33 
Notwithstanding this hint, Jameson's study leaves one with the impres-
sion that democratic ideas are immanent in the material lives and habits, 
but not in the minds, of Americans, that the Revolution itself forced a 
sudden act of self-recognition, and that only the events themselves 
brought about conscious political self-definition. 
More recent interpretations of the American Revolution, most notably 
those of Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood, carry the issues raised by 
Mcllwain and Jameson into contemporary scholarship.34 The current 
state of the argument between Whig and progressive historiography can-
not be explored here, however, for the important issue is not one of 
deciding whether to locate the meaning of the American Revolution 
before or after 1776 or even whether to stress ideas or events. Our task 
is to understand how and why these forms of historical understanding 
arose and persist to the present day. If the interpretive possibilities illus-
trated by Mcllwain and Jameson can be found in the literature on the 
meaning of constitutions in the colonial and early Revolutionary period, 
then the issue is transformed from one of historiography and periodiza-
tion to one of contending theories of politics. 
John Adams' A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1764) 
provides an early illustration of this interdependence of historiography 
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and political theory. Within the confines of one essay institutionalist 
and anti-institutionalist, proto-Whig and pro to-progressive, and consti-
tutionalist and revolutionary are joined in inner battle even as they join 
together in defense of colonial rights. A revolutionary perspective ap-
pears first in Adams' strategy of pitting the heritage of "our first an-
cestors" against the corrupt values of recently-arrived colonial officials, 
who descended from "high churchmen and statesmen." These officials 
now threaten liberty in the colonies just as their forebearers did in seven-
teenth-century England. According to Adams, the struggle must be seen 
within the larger framework of the Reformation, and the Reformation 
must be seen as the liberation of men from the shackles of canon and 
feudal law. The Reformation, therefore, connects Anglo-American po-
litical history not only to religious history but also to biblical prophecy, 
for "it was foretold" in biblical prophecy that the struggle against 
religious and political despotism is also "the great struggle that peopled 
America" and plunged England into two revolutions. Therefore, the 
American colonies represent two separate principles of religious and 
political liberty joined together in prophetic and political history. They 
yield a two-sided colonial heritage of revelation and reason, of religious 
enthusiasm and respect for learning, and of trust in the prophetic Word 
and common sense.35 
Having established a prophetic and revolutionary heritage and hav-
ing shown its past relationship to a secular and enlightened one, Adams 
reconstructs that relationship in the service of the contemporary defense 
of colonial liberty. In the process of reconstruction, however, Adams, 
the revolutionary progressive, transmutes himself into a loyal résister 
and radical Whig. Prophecy and revolution are diluted to become "a 
great spirit of liberty." This spirit, now stripped of ideational content, 
leaves only constitutional marks. Thus secularized, the early colonists 
manifested the same English spirit "which denounced hostilities against 
John till Magna Carta was signed" and brought about the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. Institutional history and constitutionalism thus be-
come the chief beneficiaries of both sides of the ancestral heritage. In-
deed, prophetic belief and millennialist hope must never become an 
impulse separate from enlightenment, for then it "would be little better 
than a brutal rage." Adams concludes that the institutional tradition 
constitutes the usable past: 
Study the law of nature; search into the spirit of the British 
constitution; read the histories of ancient ages . . . . In such re-
searches as these, let us all in our several departments cheerfully 
engage—but especially the proper patrons and supporters of law, 
learning and religion!36 
In eighteenth-century England and America, Whig constitutional 
theory rested on a secular history no longer containing apocalyptic ele-
ments. Even "real Whigs" who might recall "god's Englishmen" in re-
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counting events of the seventeenth century had no intention of emulating 
them—any more than Jonathan Mayhew did in the 1750s.37 Constitu-
tionalist perspectives and loyalty to things British are difficult to separate. 
That may account for the fact that as independence approached so many 
of those who formulated the most sophisticated constitutionalist argument 
for resistance fell silent or became loyalists. For example, in his Letters 
From a Farmer, John Dickinson rejected the possibility of independence 
in 1768 by asking "where shall we find another Britain to supply our 
loss?" Men as diverse as Dickinson, Daniel Dulaney, Jr., James Iredell 
and James Wilson seemed unable to shape their constitutional language 
into support for revolutionary action.38 And when the call for inde-
pendence was heard, these men were painfully torn between what Adams 
described as the two-sided colonial heritage. 
On the other hand, it was relatively easy to lose a British identity 
and loyalty for those whose political ideas were both more parochial 
and more closely attuned to seventeenth-century colonial versions of 
constitutionalism. The Connecticut evangelical preacher, Stephen John-
son, opposed the Stamp Act by recalling the fate of Charles I. More 
than a decade before independence his language was the rhetoric of the 
patriot: "I am an American born . . . . O my country! My dear distressed 
country! . . . To save your invaluable rights and freedom I would 
willingly die."39 The later appeal of Paine's Common Sense was partly 
based on his use of prophetic and eschatological themes. The connection 
between these themes and the wholesale rejection of a constitutional 
theory of "balanced government" was equally apparent to Paine's op-
ponents. James Chalmer's Plain Truth treats Paine's uses of Old Testa-
ment examples against monarchy with utter contempt and forcefully 
rejects Paine's attempt to link seventeenth-century English religious 
struggles to the colonial resistance.40 To conceive of America as the elect 
nation operating on the plane of prophetic history is to subvert radically 
institutional tradition and constitutional authority. 
There were other ways of transcending the confines of constitutionalist 
argument. One was to use English institutional history against itself, 
by identifying a benchmark period—Jefferson used both a state of nature 
and eighth-century Saxon England—as the measure of current English 
corruption and image of future American community. In eighteenth-
century England, this mode of argument remained constitutionalist, 
buttressing the claims of Parliament against the king and his "king's 
men," not powering a republican revolution against the entire structure 
of British institutions. In America, images of Saxon democracy and 
agrarian innocence combined explosively with visions of millennialist 
community thereby shaking the prestige of Whig constitutional theory 
and its American spokesman.41 This combination created a new form 
of constitutional theory, one radically at odds with ideals of balanced 
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government. That new theory was in part a rediscovery of the radical 
implications of seventeenth-century Puritanism. 
The tension between constitutionalist and (for want of better terms) 
prophetic and communalist political perspectives is also evident in the 
first state constitutions. Most remarkably, Connecticut and Rhode Island 
functioned for decades after the Revolution with charters framed in the 
1660s. These religiously inspired charters combined annual elections, 
a weak judiciary and legislative dominance over the executive—in short, 
many of the so-called "radical" features stressed by progressive his-
torians as proof of the post-independence "explosion" of democratic 
impulses and enlightenment philosophy. All of the other colonies re-
constituted their frames of government: those documents most faith-
fully recreating seventeenth-century features were criticized then and 
now as being products of haste and inexperience because they lacked a 
clearly structured separation of powers.42 British theories of mixed gov-
ernment and the complex American variants of separation of powers 
place primary emphasis on balanced institutional relationships. These 
political institutions, in turn, are presumed supported by a complex 
structure of stable social institutions. In this system, liberty is located 
within institutional relationships; in fact, liberty is the history of those 
institutions. The "people," according to the same formulation, are only 
one part of the equilibrium, carefully bounded by other social categories 
and institutions. Struggles over the shape of early state constitutions 
evidence deep distrust of such theories. Hostility to an independent 
judiciary and the power of trained judges, fear of executive patronage, 
veto powers and extended terms of office, insistence on annual elections 
and rotation of office, the insertion of oaths of allegiance and religious 
tests, equality of religious sects, loquacious and didactic prefaces, pre-
ambles and bills of rights, and, most crucially, the studied indifference 
to the niceties of clear distinctions among powers, duties and rights are 
all found in some degree or another in most of the constitutions framed 
from 1776 to 1780.43 
In marked contrast to prevailing eighteenth-century British theories, 
the controlling element in seventeenth-century colonial constitutions is 
found in the preambles and bills of rights which constitute the entire 
community. It is this perspective, and not complex theories of representa-
tion or later theories of majority rule, which define the core of democratic 
beliefs in colonial and post-independence America. The 1677 Conces-
sions and Agreements of West New Jersey, for example, contains a 
chapter entitled "The Common Law, or Fundamental Rights." It stipu-
lates that four times every year the entire community enact a recledica-
tion to their common rights by gathering together in each hall of justice 
and having the document read to them by the chief magistrates.44 To 
be ignorant of this early colonial constitutional tradition is to ignore a 
source of enduring features in most early state constitutions and thus 
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to leave unexplained the success of constitutional theory which arose 
in America with the victory of Jeffersonian Republicanism. John Taylor, 
enlightened deist and anti-Calvinist though he was, nonetheless defends 
the radical side of Jeffersonian constitutional theory in the early nine-
teenth century by pointing to Connecticut. The "happiness and good 
order" and the absence of "the rivalry of orders" obtains in that state, 
he concludes, because it kept its seventeenth-century constitutional charter 
after the Revolution. Historians who see only "agreement on funda-
mentals" in American political thought as constitutional theory tend to 
see only "where Paine went wrong." To picture him as outside of 
American intellectual tradition because "he never accepted the theory 
of separation of powers" is to ignore the ways in which Paine's vision, 
because it was firmly anchored to a separate American tradition of 
communal sovereignty, went from victory to victory, encompassing and 
absorbing the theory of separation of powers by relegating it to second 
place.45 
Many strong connections between resistance literature and constitu-
tional doctrines associated with the federal constitution can be discerned. 
Professor Mcllwain's story, which he ends so abruptly in 1776, would 
seem to begin again ten years later, just when Professor Jameson's flood 
tide would seem to recede. But these conclusions would leave unex-
plored the political differences which so quickly developed after the 
adoption of the federal constitution, and the remarkable shifts in con-
stitutional perspective by men such as Jefferson and Madison in one 
direction and John Adams in the other. 
John Adams' Discourses on Davila were intended as the final book 
of his Defense of the Constitutions of the United States. The work as a 
whole creates an image of a highly structured society which was already 
an anachronism, but a necessary one to support Adams' defense of the 
doctrine of separation of powers. Adams saw a future "thickening" of 
American life where politics would consist at best of "rivalry in the 
orders of society." Only powerful institutions could contain that conflict, 
even while preserving liberty.40 In contrast, by the turn of the century, 
Jefferson and Madison gave up primary reliance on constitutional and 
legal mechanics—what John Taylor contemptuously called the unreal 
world of "numerical analysis"—and planted themselves on the solid 
ground of realism which Taylor, without irony, termed "moral qualities." 
If, in Jefferson's words of 1799, "The whole body of the nation is the 
sovereign legislative, judiciary and executive power for itself" then the 
health of that body and not institutions becomes of central importance.47 
The two "institutional" innovations which we associate most promi-
nently with Jefferson—his proposal of a "ward system" and the popularly 
based political party—were in express opposition to Adams' constitu-
tional reasoning and the intellectual tradition behind it. Jefferson's 
"ward" or "hundreds" system was at once the most radically antinomian 
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proposal in American secular political thought and a haunting reminder 
of earlier Great Awakening sermons on what America would be like 
during the thousand-year reign of justice and community. In each ward 
rulers and ruled, checkers and checked, authority and liberty are merged 
to the point of indistinguishability. This is the pure fountain from 
which higher assemblies and broader governing powers flow. The unique 
feature of Jefferson's proposal is that in this hierarchy of office there is 
no lateral entry; to rise in power and distinction, every man must first be 
selected in the community of equals and prove his capacity to earn the 
trust of his immediate peers in an unstructured, undifferentiated en-
vironment. Nature and revelation become one in the most radical strains 
of Jeffersonian thought.48 
The obvious objection to Jefferson's ward scheme is that it had no 
chance of success in America. Like the theory behind it, the plan was 
too Utopian, too levelling, too Painean. The less obvious reply to that 
objection is that Jefferson's ward scheme is an almost exact description 
of political party organization as it took shape from 1820. With party, 
the notion of popular sovereignty dominated constitutional office, just 
as it already had defined constitutional theory. By 1819, the anti-party 
author of Federalist Papers Number 10 and Number 51 said, "When the 
individuals belonging to [political parties] are intermingled in every 
part of the Country, they strengthen the Union of the Whole, while they 
divide every part." The energy, loyalty, discipline and power which 
party was able to generate was a cruel revenge on those who saw in the 
United States Constitution not only a vindication, but a ratification of 
a long tradition. Like the denominations opposing the Great Awakening, 
the Federalist Party was first demoralized and then overwhelmed.49 
John Taylor's writings reveal most clearly some of the cultural 
dimensions of constitutional debate. Taylor's intent is quite simply to 
destroy at the outset any reliance on a tradition which did not begin 
with popular sovereignty, the latter defined as community bound to-
gether by a shared belief in equal rights. The first 163 pages of his first 
book on the meaning of constitutional theory in America are addressed 
to the fallacies of British constitutional theory. "To contend for forms 
only, is to fight to shadows," Taylor states in his next book. "If the acts 
of a monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are the same, these forms of 
government are to a nation essentially the same also." His deepest fear 
was of popular corruption resting on false constitutional theories. The 
most corrupting theory in the American context is the assumption that 
"intermediate orders between an individual and a nation" are consti-
tutionally necessary and desirable. Establishments of any kind—"pe-
cuniary, civil, religious, or military"—corrupt the society because they 
stand "between a nation and a government" by dividing interests and 
loyalties.50 
The tradition to which Taylor ultimately repaired was neither the 
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Enlightenment nor the French Revolution. He begins Construction 
Construed and Constitutions Vindicated by calling for a rededication 
to the spirit of Republican "puritanism" as exemplified in the English 
Civil War, the colonial settlement and the American Revolution. Taylor 
urges his readers to emulate these "civil and religious patriots." To 
structure a "combination of corporations . . . privileges and . . . specu-
lations" is to tempt all men, even political majorities, to exchange their 
liberties "for the garbage of aristocracy, and compromise with venality."51 
The American political order must rest on a common morality and 
natural rights rather than on constitutional law. Abraham Lincoln 
caught the anti-institutional voice and savored its cultural echoes when 
he proclaimed in his first Inaugural Address that "The Union is much 
older than the Constitution." 
iv whig ideas and progressive events 
Here English law and English thought / 'Gainst the self-will of 
England fought. (James Russell Lowell at Concord, 1875) 
We have founded for us the most positive of lands. The founders 
have passed to other spheres—but what are these terrible duties 
they have left us? /We require/ a sublime and serious Religious 
Democracy, sternly taking command, sloughing off surfaces, and 
from its own interior and vital principles, reconstructing, democ-
ratizing society. (Walt Whitman, 1867)52 
In American political dialogue, the meaning of what is said often 
depends upon the identity of the speaker, the style in which he speaks 
and the audience he addresses. This is as true in deciphering the 
Reverend Jonathan Mayhew's seemingly commonplace condemnation 
of licentiousness in 1750 as it is in Senator Barry Goldwater's seemingly 
commonplace 1964 call for extraordinary risks in defense of liberty. The 
dimension of conflicts in the Revolutionary period outlined above is 
not necessarily "party" division: institutionalist thought wholly defined 
the Loyalists but was also powerful among many who fought for inde-
pendence. Studies of the religious and cultural sources of intra-party 
disputes and changing party alignments in the nineteenth century, how-
ever, are evidence that these two forms of thinking form the main con-
tours of later American political consciousness. Political issues framed 
in these terms are transposed by the different audiences into symbolic 
cues of ethnic, cultural and religious identification.53 
Because twentieth-century progressive (more exactly, populist) his-
toriography is anti-institutionalist, it is the often unwitting image and 
carrier of evangelical and millennialist forms of political thought in 
America. Like the informing perspectives of Jonathan Edwards and 
John Taylor before them, the views of progressive historians are that 
institutions, establishments and even intellectual tradition are forms of 
"works"—idolatrous products of declension which periodically must be 
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destroyed or remade. The ultimate cause of these anti-institutional tri-
umphs may be a redemptive frontier, biblical prophecy or simple hatred 
of privilege. In any event, each victory is a conquest of native faith 
which smashes institutional idols as it redeems and reconstitutes the 
community. And like earlier Jeremiahs, progressive historians portray 
this conflict as the defense of American uniqueness against imported 
corruptions. Writers in this tradition have astutely been termed "his-
torians against history." The focus on events—apocalyptic moments, 
great leaders, signal victories—tends to make democratic ideas appear 
as if they were immaculately conceived for the birth of each democratizing 
movement. Time between these definitive moments is marked not only 
by consolidation but also by inevitable declension. Paradoxically, this 
manner of periodization serves Whig and progressive historian alike. 
The revelatory event for the progressive becomes "context" for the Whig, 
an altered setting within which systematic ideas can then be traced. 
Conversely, the Whig history of ideas is often accepted by progressives, 
but only as a prelude to dramatic transformation: 
Truly democratic ideas, defending a concentration of power in 
the hands of the people, are difficult to find prior to 1774. Most 
articulate colonials accepted the Whig theory in which a modicum 
of democracy was balanced by equal parts of aristocracy and 
monarchy.54 
This perspective makes it as difficult a task to write a coherent 
progressive history of American political ideas as it is to write a con-
vincing Whig history of American political events. The result is often 
a reliance on Whig versions of intellectual history. Parrington's Main 
Currents of American Thought illustrates this dependence. In his dis-
cussion of religious freedom, Parrington has such alleged proto-democrats 
as Charles Chauncy and Jonathan Mayhew doing enlightened battle 
against Jonathan Edwards, "the last of the royal line of puritan mystics" 
standing as "the last great defense of the conservatism that was stifling 
the intellectual life of New England." Fittingly, it was only "a curious 
irony of fate" that this "reactionary Calvinist . . . became the intellectual 
leader of the revolutionaries [in church polity and religious freedom]."55 
Given these difficulties, the most effective progressive solution is to 
bypass the history of ideas entirely. To Frederick Jackson Turner, the 
frontier—flowing, purifying, equalizing and unifying—washes back and 
redeems the ideas, manners and institutions of a people always threatened 
by declension. On this reading, Turner's frontier thesis is as much a 
desperate escape from entrapment in "eastern" and whiggish intellectual 
tradition as it is the daring introduction of geography and economics in 
historical explanation. In either case the result is an indirect affirmation 
of a radical Calvinist heritage, enabling Turner to celebrate the power 
of the one intellectual tradition he barely acknowledged.56 
For all of the above reasons, Whig historiography in America has 
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always been the more convincing vehicle for conveying the importance 
of political ideas. Such is the long-standing relationship between this 
mode of history and cultural-political conflict in America, however, that 
the political ideas which seem to loom so large often disappear to be-
come laws, constitutions and establishments. This transposition has the 
intended political effect of attaching the prestige of intellect and reason 
to dominant institutions in America. As persuasive history, however, 
the cost is to disconnect ideas from political action and actors. By equat-
ing ideas with institutions, one neccessarily labels leveling social move-
ments as "anti-intellectual," but the equation is considerably less effec-
tive in distinguishing, say, a Loyalist from a Whig revolutionary if both 
share the same constitutional ideas.57 A second politically powerful but 
historically implausible result is the tendency of Whig historiography 
to attribute to institutional elites—John Adams' "proper patrons and 
supporters of law, learning and religion"—the source of all political 
ideas which eventually come to dominate—even at the expense of those 
elites. Thus, the teachers of the principles of religious freedom in Amer-
ica are those who in fact supported religious establishments; resistance 
arguments voiced by many who became Loyalists taught colonists to 
fight for independence; English radical Whigs fighting for increased 
powers of Parliament at home taught resistance to Parliament to North 
American colonists. Insofar as political ideas are closely tied to a formal 
or mechanistic story of institutional evolution, this history becomes solidly 
consensual, marching above the turbulence of political battle and hu-
man motive as an enlightened legion of coherence, rationality and tra-
dition. Constitutionalist resistance literature, Joseph Story's Commen-
taries, Mcllwain's Constitutional Interpretation, Benjamin Wright's 
Consensus and Continuity and Bernard Bailyn's Ideological Origins are 
intimately connected. Their common perspective is that political speech 
not tied to institutional and legal evolution is more fustian (e.g., Common 
Sense) than a part of a durable history of ideas. And when this rhetoric 
is tied to major institutional changes (e.g., independence or church dis-
establishment) the preference of Whig historians is for contagion. That 
is to say, the rhetoric is viewed as an enthusiastic and often irrational 
extension of more coherent institutional ideas.58 Understandably, an 
inordinately large proportion of the major contributors to American 
political ideas—before, during and after the Revolution—have suffered 
grievous electoral losses. Perhaps their consolation and ours is to 
read histories showing the victors under the intellectual domination of 
the vanquished. 
History remains the single most important source of political under-
standing and consciousness in America. Conflicts over religion, law and 
constitutionalism suggest the possibility of writing a coherent "progres-
sive" history of ideas which is also firmly connected to major political 
events. This possibility would require a much closer look than hereto-
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fore at writings on prophetic history, biography, imaginative literature 
and theology as an important element in American political thought. 
Such is the present lack of historical analysis of millennialist and populist 
ideas that we stand amazed at the incredible energy of periodic anti-
institutional political movements and perplexed at the persistence of 
religious styles in shaping party alignments. Without restoring a closer 
connection between ideas and events, many of our most memorable 
political actors, actions and "speech acts" will remain mysterious; they 
will seem to be either a kind of shadow boxing at fragments of Whig ideas 
or sudden but mindless responses to changing material conditions. 
George Bancroft's History of the United States of America, is the 
most influential and long-lived story of our Revolution ever written. His 
history is also the prototype of what later became known as progressive 
history. Bancroft recorded events with such documentary care because 
he thought that American political ideas stand revealed in events and 
through the acts of representative men. His work is an anti-intellectual 
history which nevertheless draws upon the mind of only one man to lend 
authority to the entire scheme of his history, Jonathan Edwards.59 
Students of American political ideas today are closer to Jonathan May-
hew than to Jonathan Edwards. Lacking a progressive history of ideas 
we are necessarily keepers of institutional political values who neverthe-
less feel that we carry more dangerous and unsettling ideas the origin 
of which we have long forgotten or never fully understood. Having been 
taught by the institutional tradition (thinking it the only intellectual 
one) we, like Mayhew, often use it to keep anxious watch on those who 
would presume to know and to act on that other tradition without our 
understanding, guidance or control. In answer to the query "Who then 
was the author, inventor, discoverer of independence?," John Adams, 
late in his life, framed a most suggestive but ambiguous reply. Leaders 
such as Otis, Mayhew, Jefferson and he were not its authors, he said, but 
"only awakeners and revivers of the original fundamental principle of 
colonization."60 Mayhew and Edwards disagreed profoundly on what 
constitutes the fundamental principle of "the first emigrants" and even 
today echoes of that disagreement still reverberate through our histories 
of the American Revolution. 
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